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Soft Space, Hard Bargaining: Planning for High-Tech Growth in ‘Science Vale UK’ 
 
 
Abstract 
The South East of England is Britain’s ‘problem region’ of unsettled administrative and political 
arrangements centred on a dense web of generally small settlements and their complex 
interrelations. Surrounding and tied to the international finance and political centres of London, 
much of the rest of the semi-rural south-east region nevertheless exhibits a degree of 
polycentricity. Notably, within the South East of England are a series of scientific and hi-tech 
hot-spots critical to future UK economic growth. However, the achievement of significant 
growth in and around hi-tech spaces is challenging, given the context of semi-rurality and 
historic infrastructure shortfalls in some of these locations. Growth is therefore associated with 
significant planning dilemmas, a situation which has prompted the introduction of ‘soft’ planning 
spaces as a means to transcend sclerotic governance structures and planning policy stasis. 
However, these sub-regional arrangements may also represent a vehicle for the re-assertion of 
territory, refracting and reinforcing local political conflict rather than cultivating an 
unambiguous form of post-politics. We illustrate these issues with regard to the emergence of the 
‘Science Vale UK’ area in southern Oxfordshire, and consider some of the broader implications 
of planning for growth in such a distinctive settlement pattern. 
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Soft Space, Hard Bargaining: Planning for High-Tech Growth in ‘Science Vale UK’ 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The South East of England is a complex and problematic concept in the UK (Peck and Tickell, 
1992). It at once serves as a vast extended suburban hinterland for London, the increasingly 
dominant core of the UK economy as a whole, and is itself partly independent (Cochrane, 2012) 
as a constellation of high technology industries (Hall et al, 1986). It is the growth region upon 
which Thatcherite and New Labour economic development strategies were spatially focused 
(primarily, but not exclusively, on the financial and producer services sectors) but also has 
become something of a barrier to national growth, where largely conservative politics within 
local government have ensured that housing and employment land-releases have not matched 
demand. Pro-growth strategies among urban, suburban or rural local governments across the 
region have historically been few and far between. As the structural shortage of housing in the 
UK and the South East  reached an intense pitch so the previous ‘New Labour’ administrations 
of Tony Blair (1997-2007) and Gordon Brown (2007-2010) sought through various means - 
regional planning guidance, regional spatial strategies, local-area and multi-area agreements - to 
cajole growth-oriented strategies in sub-regions that straddle existing local government 
boundaries. Thus a number of what Allmendinger and Haughton (2010) have referred to as ‘soft’ 
planning spaces emerged as focal points condensing such pressures. They include three major 
growth areas that were licensed by significant central government support and funding under the 
‘Sustainable Communities: Building for the Future’ plan: Milton Keynes, Ashford and Thames 
Gateway (DCLG, 2003). They also include areas such as South Hampshire (Phelps, 2012) and 
Gatwick-Crawley that received small scale funding as growth points or were identified as 
‘Diamonds for Growth’ by the now defunct South East of England Regional Development 
Agency (SEEDA). South Hampshire and Gatwick-Crawley have featured in national and 
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regional planning exercises since the 1960s, however, which gives some indication of the 
extended time frame over which aspirations to unlock potential growth areas have foundered. 
 
In this paper we explore the emergence of ‘Science Vale UK’ (SVUK), a newly imagined 
economic and planning space constituted around three major high-tech employment sites in the 
southern part of Oxfordshire (see Figure 1). This space has been introduced to give some 
coherence to the three sites and associated spaces of housing growth, and in many ways parallels 
the broader evolution of soft spaces towards the latter part of the New Labour era. However, as 
we will see, SVUK is characteristic of the essentially unplanned historical evolution of some 
major high-tech employment sites in the UK and the South East of England in particular, and 
their consequent lack of proper economic and physical integration with surrounding settlements. 
It is apparent also that the constitution of SVUK reflected more instrumental local political 
concerns, a fact which impacts both on the nature of the area as a soft space and its potential 
capacity to respond to the structural features which condition its growth. 
 
We begin in the next section of the paper by arguing that the SVUK case is best represented as 
an ‘assemblage’ form (Allen and Cochrane, 2007; Anderson and McFarlane, 2011), comprising 
diverse and separated sites and cross-boundary political compromises and working arrangements 
in a provisional organizational structure, characteristics which tend to exemplify and extend the 
planning challenges associated with high-tech growth in the semi-rural South-East of England. 
We go on to briefly describe the methods used to collect empirical evidence on the SVUK case. 
We go on in subsequent sections to recount the story of its emergence as a soft planning space 
contrasting these with some of the hard bargains to be struck over the likes of transport 
infrastructure. We conclude with thoughts on what the SVUK case reveals regarding a 
theoretical and practical understanding of planning for economic growth in the greater South 
East of England.    
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2. Soft spaces and territorial assemblages 
Soft planning spaces were introduced as planning scales proliferated under New Labour, 
ostensibly to facilitate cross-boundary working and responsiveness to functional economic areas, 
but also evidently to disrupt existing and potentially sclerotic local government working 
arrangements and to usher-in significant policy change. In this sense they might be seen as part 
and parcel of a shift towards ‘post-politics’ (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2011; Swyngedouw, 
2007), essentially ‘defining-in’ growth as an inherent aspect of the new spaces concerned and 
thereby pre-empting alternative responses. The soft spaces which emerged might be regarded as 
a product of ‘territorial assemblages’ of governance (Allen and Cochrane, 2007). This stresses 
the manner in which networks of relations among government and non-governmental bodies and 
actors have congealed as assemblages in order to mobilize imaginaries for and act upon such 
spaces, where the soft planning spaces concerned rarely coincide with territorial jurisdictions of 
government authority and political power. Allen and Cochrane direct much of their analysis 
toward questioning the notion of regions within the UK, in line with the regional and sub-
regional arrangements introduced by the New Labour governments at that time. Here, they 
suggested,  
‘the governance of regions, and its spatiality, now works through a looser, more 
negotiable, set of political arrangements that take their shape from the networks of 
relations that stretch across and beyond given regional boundaries. The agencies, the 
partnerships, the political intermediaries, and the associations and connections that bring 
them together, increasingly form “regional” spatial assemblages that are not exclusively 
regional, but bring together elements of central, regional and local institutions’ (Allen 
and Cochrane, 2007: 1163).  
Subsequently, it might be noted, there has been some thinning-out of the congested terrain of 
planning, as the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government under David Cameron 
removed the regional tier of planning, along with centrally-sponsored mechanisms for cross-
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boundary working such as Multi-Area Agreements. However, there is ongoing churn here, with 
the introduction of Local Enterprise Partnerships in 2011 and latterly City-Deals, and it is clear 
that in some cases the momentum behind particular soft spaces has been retained, such that they 
remain an important aspect of the planning policy arena. 
 
It might be suggested that the conceptual foundations for soft spaces are more fully elaborated 
theoretically than the processes through which such territorial assemblages are constructed. Soft 
spaces are representative of the broad shift towards networked forms of decision-making, 
reflecting the increasing importance of cross-boundary and multi-scalar working in a vastly more 
fluid and interconnected governance environment. The notion of assemblages emphasizes how 
the geographical fixity implied in vertically-organised means of government (such as coercion 
and command) has been eroded by flows of finance, information, political, human and symbolic 
capital (Allen and Cochrane, 2007). These vertical means have been joined increasingly by 
‘horizontal’ means (such as reciprocity, modelling and seduction) of governing such flows. In 
particular, the latter imply a degree of policy and practice mobility within governance 
arrangements.1 Yet, integral to the notions of soft space and territorial assemblage is also 
recognition of the stickiness of formal territorial arrangements and institutionalised policy 
frameworks, and authors are careful to acknowledge the enduring claims of established 
government jurisdictions. Allmendinger and Haughton describe (2010: 813), for example: 
 
… for all its attention to themes such as flows and nodes, spatial planning has to work 
within the realities and complexities of bounded space. Indeed, it is clear that there are 
multiple spaces and scales that planners must negotiate, some of which are more fixed and 
formal than others. Moreover, whilst policy spaces and scales may be socially constructed, 
not all are equally fluid or privileged and, when planners begin to organise through 
                                                 
1 See Phelps and Wood (2011) for more detail on these points. 
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particular spaces rather than others, some will gain more purchase than others, influencing, 
for instance, where new infrastructure is provided. 
 
The outcomes of these competing impulses are, of course, complex and spatially differentiated. 
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that theoretical interpretations of the emergence of soft 
spaces are somewhat limited, given the diversity of such spaces, their fuzziness, and their 
disparate origins and motivations. Allmendinger and Haughton identify three characteristic 
forms of soft planning space which goes some way towards locating the various motivations and 
institutional forms involved, as follows: (i) `bottom-up functional', where local actors come 
together to engage with major cross-boundary growth opportunities or development locations; 
(ii) ‘shadow’ plans and strategies on different scales which effectively short-circuit slow-moving 
statutory planning processes in favour of a focus on delivery; and (iii) `top-down functional 
spaces' driven by central government departments and focused explicitly on economic 
development and competitiveness (op cit, 2010: 811-812).  
 
Clearly, detailed empirical research is necessary to further inform our understanding of the 
nature and development of soft spaces, and their impacts on policy outcomes. There is a need for 
detailed investigation of, for example: the composition of soft spaces, their emergence into 
policy arenas and associated statutory plans and policy guidance; the respective roles of public, 
private and other actors in the inception and management of such spaces; the organisational and 
other interactions which exist between soft spaces and the hard structures of local government; 
and the extent to which policy outcomes on the ground are influenced by the presence of soft 
space forms.  
 
We take forward some of these themes in our analysis of SVUK, stressing three qualifications 
when applying the notions of soft planning spaces and assemblages to this case. First the 
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territoriality of local government are absolutely central to the politics and planning for housing 
and employment growth in the South East of England. Indeed territorial boundaries are often the 
focal point for quite minor but bitter battles regarding the siting of additional land for housing 
and associated infrastructure. Moreover, some old planning instruments - such as green belts - 
have themselves hardened into important and enduring territorially-defined foci for local politics 
in their own right. Second, the science parks and high-technology employment sites in SVUK 
have existed as camps largely detached from the surrounding residential or employment 
environment and indeed local government political and planning context, being either currently 
or previously run by arms of central government or now as self-contained and fully owned 
corporate territorial enclaves. Third, then, to the extent that territorial assemblages have emerged 
to mobilize a soft planning space like SVUK they have to deal with both the vicissitudes of 
representative territorial politics and the administration and planning of these camps that exist 
somewhat outside of the local planning and political framework.  
 
3. Research Methods 
The paper draws upon a body of detailed primary and secondary research conducted during 
2010-2012. Empirical information was gathered in part from observation and recording of well 
over 100 speeches and contributions in key South Oxfordshire District Council (SODC) 
meetings, notably those concerned with the Council’s emerging ‘core strategy’, the central part 
of the district’s Local Development Framework under the 2004 Planning and Compulsory 
Purchase Act. This was undertaken both in November 2010, at the ‘proposed submission stage’ 
of the core strategy prior to its submission to central government, and again in November 2011 at 
the subsequent SODC core strategy ‘Examination in Public’. Additionally 30 interviews were 
undertaken with key informants including members and officers of SODC, neighbouring Vale of 
the White Horse District Council (VOWH) and Oxfordshire County Council, property owners 
and developers including MEPC Plc (owners of Milton Park) and Goodman Plc (Developers at 
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Harwell Oxford), the Home Builders Federation, representatives of housing developers including 
Taylor Wimpey and Berkeley Homes, the ‘Didcot Ring of Parishes’, Didcot Town Council, 
SVUK and other interests. The research has also been triangulated with further extensive 
secondary material including numerous submissions and reports as part of SODC’s core strategy 
process, and local media coverage.  
 
For the current paper we draw on a subset of this material to analyse the problems of unblocking 
growth when big science exists in a semi-rural framework. We present the story of SVUK as a 
case study (Yin, 1989) where it is difficult to disentangle the phenomenon under study from its 
wider context. This is doubly pertinent in our case since the phenomenon of science parks that 
essentially compose the economic interest to the SVUK case appear as discrete camp-like sites 
that yet can hardly be separated from their natural and man-made settings. In this respect, 
although SVUK could be considered rather unique as a case study area of high-tech employment, 
we consider it as a case study with insights valuable by extension (Burawoy, 1991) to the rest of 
the South East region in which much of the UK’s high-tech activity exists in a similar context. 
While we should be careful about treating this example as typical of the UK experience, it is 
certainly instructive in terms of setting the relationship between UK science and technology 
parks and contemporary patterns and processes of urbanization and associated planning 
dilemmas in sharp relief. 
 
4. Science Vale UK 
SVUK came into use in 2008 to delimit a space which encompassed the towns of Didcot, 
Wantage and Grove, and the predominately hi-tech employment centres of Harwell Oxford, 
Milton Park and Culham Science Centre. The area accounts for about 4% of total R&D 
employment in England and 13% in the South East area (OxonCC, 2010). It could be considered 
a ‘bottom up functional’ soft space in Allmendinger and Haughton’s (2010) terms, but one that 
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remains crucially detached from its national, region and even county-wide context - one that has 
been mobilised by familiar territorial political agendas and yet is attempting to act upon quite 
impermeable or bounded ‘science park’ entities.   
Figure 1: SVUK area (highlighted) and wider context 
 
 
Source: Adapted from South Oxfordshire District Council Core Strategy, Proposed Submission 
Version, December 2010 
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Three hi-tech sites in a soft planning space 
Milton Park is central to the SVUK area and strategically placed next to the A34 trunk road 
which connects the port of Southampton on the south coast and the manufacturing centres of the 
West Midlands. In the post-war years it had been a Ministry of Defence supplies depot located 
for its excellent railway access, but it was the first of the three SVUK sites to be privatized and 
operated by a commercial real estate company and is home to a diversity of industries. The depot 
site was auctioned for sale in 1971 and commercial floor space tripled under several owners 
before the purchase of the site by current owners MEPC in 1984. Remnants of its military past in 
the form of ‘temporary’ depot structures – often highly sought after by small high technology 
companies – remain visible. Even as a commercial operation it nevertheless remains somewhat 
detached from the planning system since the freehold to the entire site including the roads and 
adjacent pieces of land are owned by property and development company MEPC, with the only 
obvious restriction on development being pressure from local communities attempting to 
preserve a presumption in favour of building heights not exceeding two storeys. Milton Park is 
now one of Europe's largest multi-use business parks, hosting more than 160 companies 
employing around 6,500 people, with particular strengths in the bio-tech and ICT sectors 
(Lawton-Smith, 2010; Boon, 1997; Boon and Gashe, 2001). 
Figure 2: Aerial view of Milton Park 
 
 
Source: MEPC 
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The success of Milton Park has, in important respects, resulted from an accidental planning 
policy context. The 100 hectare site was initially highlighted for small scale light industrial 
development in Oxfordshire County Council’s first Structure Plan (1979), under B2 (general 
industrial) and B8 (storage and distribution) land use classifications. Branded as ‘Milton Trading 
Park,’ the site accounted for a large percentage of Oxfordshire’s industrial, warehouse and 
distribution activity. A number of factors contributed to the change in approach for planning at 
Milton Park. Firstly, in 1980 Oxfordshire County Council was subject to the removal of 
development control powers, in favour of the Vale of White Horse (VOWH) District Council, 
which was able to employ a broader range of land use classification in the area. In addition, 
changes in planning policy allowed greater flexibility for VOWHDC. This included the ‘1987 
Use Classes Order’ and the ‘1988 General Development Order’ issued by central government for 
planning guidance purposes. The changes in planning legislation introduced ‘Class B1’ as a land 
use classification (Boon & Gashe, 2001), meaning that a large amount of land and the very 
substantial existing floorspace allocated for warehousing and ancillary activities could be 
redeployed for other commercial activities without requiring planning permission for a formal 
change of use. Consequently, planning policy for office, high-tech and light-industrial activities 
became considerably more flexible and accommodating. This facilitated a much wider range of 
development at Milton Park compared to the previous Structure Plan commitments, resulting in 
an increase in office-based employment and a purposeful re-positioning as a base for high-tech 
activities. 
 
It is worth noting, however, that regardless of the removal of development control powers in the 
late 1980s, Oxfordshire County Council expressed serious reservations regarding the growth of 
the site. The County Council emphasised the loss of existing land-uses and that such significant 
growth in employment may also attract an unmanageable level of demographic and residential 
growth (Oxfordshire County Council, 1987). Overall, then, as the research of Boon and Gashe 
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(2001) illustrates, Milton Park is a site that emerged quite accidentally as the by-product of more 
wide-ranging changes in the planning system, in many senses developing in spite of statutory 
development planning policies. 
 
In comparison, the development of Harwell Oxford has been led predominately by public sector 
growth and investment. Royal Air Force base Harwell was established in the 1930s and was used 
throughout World War II until late-1945. In 1946 the Atomic Energy Research Establishment 
(AERE) was created by the Ministry of Supply at the Harwell site, with a focus on research and 
development for nuclear power. During a ten year period of rapid development and construction, 
the ‘UK Atomic Energy Authority’ (UKAEA) formed at Harwell with the Rutherford Appleton 
Laboratory soon after. The UKAEA was given a 'Special Development Order' (SDO) by the 
Government in 1954, which allowed building of any kind in the pursuit of nuclear energy. 
However, as nuclear research activity on the site was gradually wound-up the SDO was removed 
in 1997, meaning that development on the site would be subject to the normal operations of the 
UK planning system. Significant areas of land are currently restricted for future development as 
a result of the decommissioning of the nuclear facilities and related land. However, the vast 385 
hectare site now functions on a commercial basis with the majority of UKAEA privatised as 
AEA Technology Plc (UKAEA, 2010) and the site managed as a locked 50/50 joint venture 
between AEA/Science and Technology Facilities Council and business/science park property 
company Goodmans. Harwell is a leading site for bioscience research in the UK, with both the 
Diamond Synchrotron, the UK’s largest investment in science for 30 years and ISIS, the world's 
largest pulsed neutron source onsite, together with the Science and Technology Facilities 
Council, the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, the Medical Research Council and European 
Space Agency Space Centre amongst others, with more than 4,500 people working in over 140 
organisations. 
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Figure 3: Aerial view of Harwell 
 
 
 
Source: UKAEA 
 
Culham Science Centre is the third major employment site in SVUK.  Located in the greenbelt of 
South Oxfordshire, the 80 hectare site is the location for the UKAEA headquarters and currently 
the world’s largest Fusion Experiment; the ‘Joint European Torus’ (JET) conducted within the 
Culham Centre for Fusion Energy research centre. In parallel with Harwell, Culham had been a 
military outpost during the Second World War, housing the Fleet Air Arm’s Royal Naval Air 
Station, HMS Hornbill. The airfield was closed by the Admiralty in 1956 and transferred to the 
UKAEA as an offshoot of Harwell in 1960. It now hosts an 800,000 square metre scientific 
research site that includes two major nuclear fusion experiments, as well as a variety of related 
and spin-off enterprises. 
 
As this initial outline suggests, SVUK is made up of diffuse and disparate entities. The three 
major employment sites are quite distinct in terms of their character and their future development 
requirements and are physically separated from each other across 10 miles of relatively open 
countryside. They are also woven around an intricate network of historic villages and near to 
formally designated Green Belt and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty. Two of the three sites 
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are poorly connected to, if not somewhat isolated from, significant settlements and population, 
reflecting their histories as sensitive wartime military establishments and subsequently 
government nuclear research institutes. While SVUK has emerging advantages in terms of its 
location in relation to national road, rail and air networks, and given the significant road 
improvements that have been undertaken in recent decades to improve access to motorways and 
major trunk roads, the infrastructure shortfall within and surrounding this soft planning space is 
clearly evident (Figure 4 gives a flavour of typical road conditions in the area). The area is 
characterised predominantly by small two-lane roads, a lack of alternative routes between the 
various sites, bottlenecks produced by two single-lane bridges across the Thames and limited rail 
and public transport options. Importantly, each site has functioned, and to some extent still 
continues to function, somewhat outside the formal planning system and to a degree beyond the 
attentions of local governments and the new networks or assemblages of governance that might 
seek to mobilise them. Additionally, we might note that the SVUK site as a whole is bisected by 
the administrative boundary between SODC and VOWHDC, adding a further complication to 
the planning context. To a large degree, therefore, the respective sites themselves have been 
essentially unplanned in formal terms and relatively detached from broader strategic planning 
processes. The sites have not been developed as integrated or self-contained entities and have 
operated quite separately from other key aspects of development activity; it is noteworthy, for 
example, that the three major sites contain almost no housing provision. In many respects, 
therefore, these might be seen as individual and differentiated ‘clumps’ of high-tech activity 
(Forsyth, 2011) projected onto a mainly rural background, rather than integrated and planned 
‘campus-garden’ developments (Forsyth and Crewe, 2010). 
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Figure 4: Village lanes – A415 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ photograph 
 
In light of this, the process of imagining and governing SVUK as a coherent high-tech space is 
fraught with difficulties. There are significant challenges of mobilising popular, political and 
technical support and of coordinating appropriate funding streams across jurisdictions, 
something we consider further below in relation to transport infrastructure. There is the 
challenge of constructing and maintaining a meaningful identity for a new soft planning space 
and a capacity to act upon it, as well as the critical task of integrating future development 
potential into the wider strategic planning of a semi-rural, village-based environment. Here the 
mobilization of SVUK, however contingent, is some sort of evidence that ‘new political realities 
are assembled around particular concerns without necessarily ever being fully integrated into 
some overarching unified set of understandings’ (Cochrane, 2010: 371-372). There is also, as we 
have suggested, the problem that such an emergent governance assemblage is attempting to act 
upon high-tech sites that have historically been partially or wholly removed from wider 
representative and participatory democratic political processes of local government planning 
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activities. Nevertheless, SVUK has emerged as a soft planning space which has been recognised 
in formal planning policy and official documentation and has gained some traction in securing 
support for planned growth both across local government boundaries and across the three major 
commercial sites.  
 
The Emergence of SVUK 
The SVUK concept (known initially as the ‘Quadrant’) emerged at the tail end of the era of 
Regional Economic Strategies (RES) established under the New Labour Governments (1997-
2010) and the parallel enabling of cross-boundary agreements across local government districts 
(so called Multi-Area Agreements) designed to promote new planning spaces at the sub-regional 
scale. The agenda nationally was upon encouraging strategies for the delivery of employment 
and housing growth, with a corresponding recognition that many key growth areas and points 
would straddle existing local government boundaries. There is a clear sense in which the move 
towards SVUK was facilitated by these broader developments, and it was subsequently officially 
recognized in the South-East Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS – The ‘South East Plan’, SEP) in 
2009. However, the initial impulse for introducing the forerunner of SVUK also reflects rather 
more parochial concerns. In 2006-7 the then Chief Executive Officer at VOWH introduced the 
notion of a ‘Quadrant’ based around Wantage, Grove, Harwell and Milton Park (and 
incorporating Didcot) as a mechanism for competing more effectively for funding allocations 
within Oxfordshire, given a perception that current arrangements were favouring Oxford city and 
other areas of the county rather than the Vale. A senior executive officer at SODC/VOWH 
reflected in interview: 
 
It was the then Chief Exec at the Vale was the person who thought - I’ll be honest, I 
believe this was his primary objective - here we were sitting in this area of the Vale with 
these phenomenal companies and this fantastic potential, but it was such a poor relation to 
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Oxford. His district council was not faring well in the way funding was being cut up even 
within Oxfordshire. It was a Lib-Dem district council, but a Conservative county council, 
and in some ways if you look at the expenditure profiles they would probably bear that out. 
So there were always tensions between that individual and the County Council. They 
didn’t fare very well, and so he talked to me about this idea of a ‘Quadrant’ around 
Wantage, Grove, Harwell and Milton Park – and it sort of crept onto Didcot. His objective 
was to say ‘look, we’re here and we’re not being recognised and there should be money 
and investment coming in’. That’s where it really started, with that individual. 
As the idea took shape and was taken forward by senior officials, it became apparent that 
planning officers in the districts were seen as increasingly out of step with the growth agenda 
that was beginning to emerge. Planning officers - who were by now shared across SODC and 
VOWH - and planning policy were viewed by Council executives as inflexible and preoccupied 
by environmental concerns, and as such would have to be reoriented towards planning for 
growth in the area. The senior officer went on to describe the process through which such 
redirection was cultivated as SODC moved towards its new core planning strategy, the central 
part of its Local Development Framework under the 2004 Planning and Compulsory Purchase 
Act, from 2008: 
 
I set up a team of senior politicians who took the lead on SODC’s core strategy and that 
was partly because at that time our planners’ thinking was lagging quite some way behind 
the political aspirations. Left to those planners… well, they were holding us back. They 
were all about protecting the environment – a unique environment – but their prioritisation 
was all about protection and we couldn’t shift their thinking. So we had a team of senior 
politicians who worked on it who were very employment-oriented, very focused on the 
need to increase wealth, and to make life easier and painless in terms of planning processes 
for business. Some businesses were experiencing the pain of working with planning. So the 
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politicians set the vision and the objectives within the core strategy. (Senior Council 
Executive, SODC/VOWH, 4 August 2011). 
 
In addition, anticipating potential opposition amongst some local politicians, senior officers 
worked with the leading group of committed pro-growth Councilors to cement the powerful 
vision around the emergent SVUK project: 
 
We built up a very strong cohort of politicians centrally around this phenomenal success 
story. If we hadn’t had SVUK as an entity we would not have succeeded here. We said: 
Look at what we’ve got here – the bioscience cluster at Milton Park, the cryogenics, the 
space centre, ISIS, the Diamond Synchrotron, and of course Culham with JET [‘Joint 
European Torus’ - European fusion experiment] and MAST [‘Mega-Amp Spherical 
Tokamak’ – UK fusion experiment]. Phenomenal international projects. In fact, our 
politicians had never understood what was on their doorstep. They never understood it. So 
we organised bus tours – we took them to Diamond and JET etc. and it was: ‘Wow’! These 
were epiphanies for a lot of those individuals, and they bought the vision. (Interview, 
Senior Officer, SODC/VOWH, 4 August 2011) 
 
Following the initiation of the SVUK concept, moves were undertaken to substantiate the idea in 
organizational terms and to drive the project forward. SVUK was formalized in organizational 
terms as a partnership with a management board drawn from the district and county authorities, 
UKAEA, MEPC, STFC and the South East England Development Agency, though serviced 
directly on a very limited basis predominantly by a single employee. A consultants report was 
commissioned in 2007 to investigate the nature and economic potential of the SVUK area, 
though this served to underline the sense of relative neglect felt in the districts in the of south of 
the county since it argued that the competitive position of SVUK – its scale and image - when set 
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against the universities and their science parks in and around the city of Oxford to the north 
(SQW, 2007).  
 
Nevertheless, the SVUK concept has become well-established as a planning entity and is 
referenced widely in formal planning documentation including, for example, the (former) South-
East Plan (SEP), Oxfordshire County Council transportation policies and the Local Development 
Frameworks and Core Strategies of relevant district councils. It also underscored a broader shift 
in Oxfordshire’s overall planning context marked initially by the South East of England 
Development Agency’s adoption of the Regional Economic Strategy in 2006 and subsequently 
incorporated into the SEP. A representative of the County’s Spatial Planning and Infrastructure 
Partnership commented: 
 
Harwell, Culham, Milton Park… they’re all key areas of activity. There has been a change 
of emphasis over time. You can go back a couple of structure plan periods certainly, and 
economic growth was almost a dirty word in Oxfordshire. Looking at Oxford (city), it was: 
‘you don’t want to overheat the economy’. The underlying theme in a couple of structure 
plans was: ‘well, ok, we want to support the rural economy, we do want to push housing 
out to the county-towns because we want to protect the greenbelt around Oxford’… but 
jobs hadn’t necessarily flowed. There was an element where the Structure Plans were 
trying to encourage economic growth outwards, to match the ‘housing for sustainable 
communities’ point of view, rather than saying we need to get full square behind the area 
as a powerhouse engine of the economy. With the Regional Economic Strategy and the 
introduction of idea of the Central Oxfordshire ‘Diamond for Growth’, there was a change 
of focus. That is, we needed to look at things more carefully in terms of what we’re trying 
to do, and the natural assets of Harwell and Culham and Milton Park all coming together 
started to do that. Then you started to get your key ribbon of development up the A34: 
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SVUK in the south, Oxford city, and, in a different way, Bicester to the north of the county 
(Oxfordshire SPIP officer, Interview 22 March 2012). 
 
By late-2011, however, SVUK no longer employed any individual directly, and its status was 
under consideration, especially in the light of the newly-arrived Oxfordshire Local Enterprise 
Partnership, introduced in March 2011. Also, while our interviews revealed quite widely-held 
support for SVUK as a suitable basis upon which to promote future economic growth and 
associated development, even amongst groups who have major reservations regarding 
particular sites, there is also a view that the project runs up against the unavoidable politics of 
territory and the strictures of formal planning policy. The comments of a developer/consultant 
in response to the question of whether the existence of SVUK had changed the way planning 
is approached were instructive: 
 
I think it has. There’s a definite feeling that all the different organisations are trying to 
pull together. For example, infrastructure. We’ve had discussions with the County 
Council about the strategic road links – how it’s going to be funded and how we put 
together the Infrastructure Delivery Plan. There’s been a more coordinated approach… 
but then again probably not as coordinated as it could or should have been. We’ve 
been pointing out for some time that it’s odd that you’ve got two councils working on 
SVUK, bringing forward two core strategies. They’ve actually got the same 
management team, the same Chief Executive, the same Head of Planning and Head of 
Planning Policy, and yet they’ve got two completely separate core strategies that are 
running to different timescales. They’ve got an upcoming Didcot Area Action Plan 
which actually will cross the boundary – but this AAP is not going to deal with the big 
issues. The big issues are dealt with first, through the separate core strategies. So, yes, 
SVUK has made a difference on a day-to-day level; it’s brought people together, it’s 
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got people talking about infrastructure delivery, about employment, about where the 
housing is going. But in terms of the actual planning mechanisms, the actual process 
of plan-making, it hasn’t. It’s almost outside of Planning that people are now talking 
to each other and working, but inside Planning it’s still very much the old system 
which is creaking along. I see it as a two tier approach. 
 
What this suggests is that in spite of the resonance of the SVUK concept and its role in 
underpinning a shift away from the growth constraints associated with the Structure Plan era, it 
remains a fragile entity largely inserted into, rather than transforming, the formal mechanisms of 
planning policy and the existing politics of territory. Indeed, the process of imagining and 
governing a new soft planning space such as SVUK necessarily and quite quickly resolves itself 
into a host of practical and technical considerations regarding strategic issues such as allocations 
of land for housing and finding and funding appropriate transport infrastructure improvements. 
We go on to consider in more detail the deliberations over how to provide for greater 
accessibility to the three key sites across the SVUK area. 
 
5.  Hard Bargaining: The Example of Transport Infrastructure  
The distinctive physical form and historical evolution of SVUK has given rise to intractable 
problems regarding the unblocking of future growth in the area, not least with regard to 
transportation infrastructure. A number of factors contribute to this: First, southern Oxfordshire 
is characterised by a dispersed population in villages outside of the main towns of Didcot, 
Wantage and Grove, a pattern which places significant demands and constraints on the transport 
infrastructure in the area. Car ownership is particularly high; in 2001, 46.9% of households were 
in ownership of two or more cars, compared to the average of the South-East region at 27.9% 
(Kier and Goodman 2008). Secondly, the hi-tech sites are located away from the main towns, 
creating a disaggregated set of elements that will contribute towards planned growth. Thirdly, the 
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predominantly rural road network and the main A34 have, at peak times of the day, been 
operating at capacity for some time already. 
 
Notwithstanding these constraints, the SVUK area is programmed for significant growth with 
approximately 13,000 net additional dwellings and 12,000 additional jobs planned by 2026 
(OxonCC, 2010: 8). The major allocations of housing and projected employment growth have in 
fact remained unchanged despite the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government’s revocation of the SEP, the RSS under which these growth proposals were 
formalized. Indeed, while many local authorities seized the opportunity to reduce often 
politically unpopular housing allocations under the RSS system, decisions in southern 
Oxfordshire to support the growth commitment at SVUK are revealing of some of the 
commitment to underpinning growth in the area (see Valler, Phelps and Wood, 2012). This is 
despite the perceived fear that housing development will occur without improvements in the 
accompanying road and other infrastructure. In terms of road infrastructure particularly these 
fears are not without some basis and serve to underline the historically disarticulated nature of 
planning for growth not just in SVUK area but also elsewhere (While et al, 2004; Phelps, 2012). 
 
The prospects for significant transport infrastructure investment are clearly circumscribed by 
policy set at national scale. Rhetorically, at least, the Coalition Government is committed to 
infrastructure as a centrepiece of its growth agenda. The approach was emphasised in a series of 
publications including ‘Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s Potential’ (BIS, 2010) and the 
‘Plan for Growth’ which called for ‘fundamental improvements in infrastructure systems’ in the 
UK (HM Treasury/BIS, 2011: 13). The National Infrastructure Plan set out funding allocations 
and initiatives to enable innovative local infrastructure solutions (HM Treasury, 2011). However, 
this referred primarily to the Regional Growth Fund (RGF) announced in June 2010. The RGF 
allocated £1.4bn for projects to lever-in private sector investment and remove dependency on 
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public sector funding. The SVUK Partnership submitted an RGF bid for the area that sought to 
further facilitate road development planning to underpin exceptional growth potential in southern 
Oxfordshire. The bid aimed to deliver £60-70m investment over a 20-year plan period in order to 
support the proposed residential and employment development. The partnership emphasised that 
60% of the overall investment required would be contributed via Section 106 agreements, 
therefore unlocking potential for private sector investment. The bid highlighted that without 
public sector funding, private firms were unlikely to invest in strategic transport priorities, 
resulting in ‘market failure’. It also argued that after 2017 the growth potential of SVUK would 
be severely compromised by increasingly problematic infrastructure constraints (SVUK 
Partnership, 2011). However, the bid was unsuccessful, apparently due to a combination of 
factors: the long time horizon of job creation connected with road improvements (15 years); that 
job creation would be indirect (in the form of retaining or attracting companies to SVUK); and a 
lack of up-front commitment from the private sector to part-fund roads. 
 
More generally, the problems of financing infrastructure directly and indirectly related to 
development are enormous in the vacuum created by the current context of fiscal austerity 
coupled with incomplete proposals for new funding mechanisms like the Community 
Infrastructure Levy (CIL) that have emanated from central government. Funding for strategic 
infrastructure projects has been reduced considerably leaving increased emphasis on developer 
contributions associated with new development as the critical basis for infrastructure delivery. 
The Coalition Government’s early withdrawal of significant Department of Transport funding to 
Oxfordshire County Council for transportation infrastructure effectively removed the £62m 
‘Access to Oxford’ programme agreed by the previous Labour Government in 2007, which had 
incorporated a series of measures for the A34 important to the functioning of SVUK, including 
junction improvements both within and outside the SVUK area, and active traffic management 
schemes. 
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Prior to the present public expenditure cuts, the arrival of the Regional Economic Strategy and 
the introduction of the Central Oxfordshire ‘Diamond for Growth’ in 2006 had prompted 
Oxfordshire County Council to undertake considerable research and preparatory work to identify 
strategic transport infrastructure priorities in the southern part of the County. A series of 
transportation reports2 were subsequently integrated into the ‘SVUK Transport Study’ (OxonCC, 
2011b), which itself was embedded within the Local Transport Plan 3 (LTP3) for Oxfordshire 
(OxonCC, 2011). This set out strategic and transport priorities and proposed infrastructure 
investments as described in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Table 1: Strategically important transport infrastructure proposals 
Scheme Town/Village Cost 
Improving the road network 
Harwell Strategic Link Road Harwell  
 
£42.5m 
Harwell Field Link Road Harwell 
Rowstock Western Link Road Didcot  
Wantage Eastern Link Road Wantage 
Junction improvements All of SVUK 
Traffic calming for surrounding villages  All of SVUK 
Other: 
Improve bus services All of SVUK £11.5m 
Improve cycling and walking network All of SVUK £2.0m 
Source: OxonCC, 2011 
 
As Table 1 illustrates, these schemes are expected to cost approximately £56m in total. The 
proposals are sought to mitigate the direct impacts of residential and employment development 
in SVUK, in addition to the cumulative impact of overall development in the area on the 
Oxfordshire strategic highways network. The LTP3 ‘Integrated Funding Block’ allocated 
specific rounds of funding to a number of strategic areas of transport policy throughout the plan 
period (2011-2030). In the case of SVUK however: 
                                                 
2 Initially, a private transport consultancy was sourced to help establish an evidence base of transport infrastructure 
required to address issues that may restrict growth in southern Oxfordshire; this became known as the ‘Southern 
Central Oxford Transport Study’ (SCOTS).  However, after the consideration of the growth potential around the 
SVUK area, it was decided to integrate the SCOTS analysis with that of the ‘Didcot Integrated Transport Study’ 
(OxonCC, 2005) and the ‘Wantage & Grove area Strategic Transport Study’ (OxonCC 2005). 
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‘LTP3 only guarantees the County Council £200,000 per year.  This is only £3m over the 
SVUK plan period in addition to the £8m we already hold.  With the required road 
schemes at present estimated at £42.5m, we currently have a funding shortfall of around 
£32m (County Council Transport Officer, 6 January 2011).  
 
Figure 5: Future Roads and Housing Development at SVUK 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Oxfordshire LTP3, OxonCC, 2011 
 
Given the substantial funding shortfall for the delivery of strategically important schemes, and in 
light of an early lack of progress towards implementing CIL, Oxfordshire County Council’s 
transport planning team commenced in 2011 an assignment to address developer contributions 
for SVUK. The work sought to propose a methodology for the collection of contributions as a 
precursor to CIL. A County Council transport planner described: 
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‘At the moment the fallback position - which is looking fairly promising in terms of 
deliverability - is that the developers pay for it.  Calculations that we have currently done 
in our loose opinion doesn’t make the sites unviable.  Obviously the developers may have a 
different opinion, but it’s not that far off what we’re currently seeking per dwelling or per 
job. So we feel that probably in terms of delivering the overall package... once all of the 
section 106 money has come in then it’s fine’ (Interview, 6 January 2011). 
 
At present, however, it should be noted that only 6% of planning permissions in England 
contribute financially to infrastructure development (CLG, 2008). CIL, in contrast, would ensure 
that all developments, regardless of size, contribute financially to transport infrastructure in 
SVUK. There are however, a number of important issues to address before this can be seen as a 
feasible approach to funding infrastructure not the least of which is how planning for growth 
negotiates the rather several nature of the high-tech sites involved. Also, financial contributions 
can only be sought from developments that are new or are increasing gross floor space. For 
example, an attempt to take contributions per square metre for B1a, B1B and B8 use at Culham 
Science Park may not be feasible. Specifically, under the CIL regime the County Council would 
not be able to request any financial contributions from Culham Science Park due to the nature of 
development at this site. In this case there is no planned change in gross floor space, which 
would be subject to CIL charges. Rather Culham Science Park is categorised as ‘redevelopment’ 
which, under the current regime, is deemed positive for the local and national economy, and 
therefore should not be presented with additional financial barriers. 
 
Additionally, here, although it appears vital that the County Council seek to provide for the 
area’s collective infrastructure needs, the appetite of the private sector in this respect is likely to 
be limited. For example, contributions of £4m were received only recently from MEPC for 
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junction improvements to the A34 at the Milton (Park) Interchange and it is hard to see 
additional commitments coming forward as an interviewee highlighted: 
 
‘I mean MEPC would not do that now. That’s major money. Having made that decision 
and going ahead, and then the recession hitting, you know... they won’t do that again!  
That was exceptional, and don’t forget it was absolutely critical. For them, that’s their front 
door. So they had to make really difficult decisions about that. We don’t want to get to the 
financial issues generally with SVUK that we got into with Milton Interchange 
specifically’ (SVUK Representative, 6 July 2011). 
 
A further point arises here relating to the Joint Infrastructure Delivery Plan (IDP; 
SODC/VOWH, 2011) developed on the basis of the SVUK Transport Study that would provide 
the evidence base to underpin the district councils’ Core Strategy documents and demonstrate 
how infrastructure will be provided to enable the planned level of growth. The IDP documents 
for SVUK sought to provide a list of transport schemes associated with the strategic housing and 
employment sites, classifying them in terms of importance as ‘critical’, ‘necessary’ or 
‘preferred’. The district councils appeared confident that development would not be permitted if 
‘critical’ infrastructure was yet to be delivered. However, it is noteworthy that not one strategic 
transport scheme was categorised as ‘critical’ in this document, and while the schemes in 
question clearly present high priorities we might speculate that there could be legal challenges 
when residential developers submit planning applications within SVUK, but seek to reduce the 
potential CIL charges associated with transport infrastructure provision. 
 
Within the overall context of substantial constraint on transport infrastructure provision, the 
introduction of CIL as a new method of collecting standardized contributions towards 
infrastructure provision in support of development adds a further dimension to hard bargaining 
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over soft planning spaces. At the present time Oxfordshire local authorities are consulting and 
negotiating over the level of CIL, which will be set by the district councils and Oxford City 
Council who become the charging and collecting authorities. The respective charging structures 
will reflect the councils’ perceptions of infrastructure needs arising from proposed new 
development in their areas, as set out in the relevant Local Development Frameworks, along with 
their judgement of the likely impact on development viability of the proposed charge. As a report 
from the Oxfordshire Spatial Planning and Infrastructure Partnership makes clear (Oxfordshire 
SPIP, 2011), the intent of CIL is not that charging rates should be used as a planning or 
economic development tool with which to compete with other authorities, though the early 
indications are that this may be evident in some cases. Also, there will be a need for a 
coordinated approach to the provision of key strategic and cross-boundary infrastructure, and 
councils will be subject to a general ‘duty-to-cooperate’, though this ‘is not clearly defined and is 
a matter for local interpretation and negotiation’ (Oxfordshire SPIP, 2011). In this context it is 
perhaps not at all surprising that the County’s SPIP highlights the potential for significant 
difficulties: 
 
Without questioning the Oxfordshire authorities’ willingness to co-operate with each other 
and infrastructure providers it may not be enough to rely upon bilateral negotiations 
between collecting authorities and infrastructure providers as a means of transferring CIL 
revenue where this is needed to fund strategic, cross-authority, or indeed cross-county, 
infrastructure, which serves the wider interests of the Partnership (Oxfordshire SPIP, 2011) 
 
In many respects the prospects for significant improvements to major transport - particularly 
roads - infrastructure seem remote. It would appear that in the absence of substantial central 
government investment, and given the potential complexities and tensions of CIL, the likelihood 
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is one of relative stasis regarding the central infrastructural challenges in and around SVUK, 
along the lines of recent experience:  
 
One of the big challenges for Oxfordshire is that with the three growth areas in the county, 
SVUK, Oxford and Bicester, they are all serviced by the A34. Yet to a point each authority 
is having their own individual conversation with the Highways Agency. It’ll be: ‘a little bit 
of improvement on junction X, or junction Y’. But if you keep chucking more and more 
development on the route up from Southampton to Birmingham, and then really important 
knowledge-based growth is deterred from any of those nodes along the A34, then there’s a 
problem. I’m not saying it can be made into a motorway – certainly there are sensitive 
ecological areas where it can’t. But actually, it’s ending up with piecemeal changes doing 
little bits of tweaking and not really solving the problem, rather than saying if we’re going 
to do it, we will just have to make a hard decision and say money is needed to change parts 
of the A34. In the end, if there has to be a strategic road taking freight up from 
Southampton up to the Midlands, and at the same time you’ve also got to facilitate hi-tech 
knowledge exchange between different companies in the area which do need to engage 
with each other – then it puts a lot of pressure on a limited road network (Oxfordshire SPIP 
officer, Interview 22 March 2012). 
 
6. Conclusion 
As a new planning space, SVUK is an emerging story built around a complex assemblage of 
governance in Allen and Cochrane’s (2007) terms. In fashioning something of a common agenda 
for SVUK, this assemblage or network of interests has sought to embrace three rather different 
physical sites and diverse private and public sector interests. To some extent this has reinforced a 
growth agenda introduced as part of the Regional Economic Strategy in 2006 and extended by 
the South East Plan in 2009. These regional frameworks certainly shifted the planning context in 
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Oxfordshire from a previously defensive and protectionist stance to one more clearly oriented 
towards growth, and SVUK forms an important part of this agenda. To a degree, then, the 
emergence of SVUK clearly reflects some of the post-politics inherent in the term 
‘sustainability’ that has pervaded planning practice (Cochrane, 2010) and the many soft spaces 
(Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010) promoted under the later New Labour years. 
 
Yet growth is in no sense a unified proposition. Built into the very conception of SVUK are 
existing agendas and prior institutional relationships which militate against any unambiguous 
form of growth-orientated post-politics. Indeed, SVUK might well be seen as the latest 
incarnation of a policy conflict in Oxfordshire played out over an extended period in County 
Council Structure Plans which have directed growth and resources away from the city of Oxford, 
in favour of the expansion of the smaller county-towns. SODC and VOWH have sought to 
maintain and further this agenda through the introduction of SVUK and there is little doubt that 
this conflict will re-emerge in the difficult processes of CIL charging and allocations. In many 
ways, therefore, SVUK is an expression of pre-existing territorial tensions, and its presence as a 
soft-space in no way negates ongoing conflict and competition amongst the various local 
authorities in Oxfordshire. SVUK, instead of opening up an unchallenged ‘post-political’ space 
upon which to impose a growth agenda, in practice and in detail produces any number of new 
lines for political contestation as has the rhetoric of sustainability in planning more generally in 
the South East of England (Abram, Murdoch and Marsden, 1996; Cochrane, 2010).  The lines of 
political contestation apparent often serve to highlight their lineage in long-entrenched cultures 
and assumptions that can inhere within planning (notably at the county scale in Britain). 
 
If, as seems plausible, the strength and durability of new sub-regional soft planning spaces will 
be a reflection of the coherence, including the regional accessibility and internal connectivity, of 
those spaces then SVUK appears as a problematic space within a problem region. Plainly there 
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are considerable challenges in terms of roads infrastructure provision for development at SVUK. 
In many respects these highlight the dispersed characteristics of the area and the assemblage 
form of governance which pertain. There are, for example, intractable problems posed by the 
physical nature and location of the existing developments and the constraints of the established 
infrastructure, which pose significant challenges to the future growth of the area. Governance of 
the area is somewhat provisional and the limits of private sector investment in transport 
infrastructure provision are increasingly recognised. Also, we might suggest that planning for 
such investment still in many ways reflects the assumptions of the pre-austerity era. 
Arrangements for potential transport infrastructure funding are at best formative, and these have 
not been strengthened significantly by the arrival of the Oxfordshire Local Enterprise Partnership 
(LEP) in March 2011 or the announcement of an Enterprise Zone for SVUK in August 2011. In 
these circumstances there must be some grounds for scepticism regarding the scope for 
substantial local infrastructure investment in the context of ongoing national austerity. 
 
Moreover, the distinctive conditions of the South East of England would seem to suggest that 
this case will be anything but unusual. Certainly, the politics of housing and infrastructure 
provision will be critically important to the achievement of science-based high-tech growth in 
many parts of the outer-South East. To date, the development of the arc of high tech employment 
in the outer South East of England (Hall et al, 1986) has occurred largely in spite of the local 
government system and its political, planning and economic development agendas. It remains to 
be seen whether SVUK as an initiative embracing some of the UK’s most important ‘big-
science’ installations can endure as a new planning space offering valuable insights into how 
intractable questions regarding the unblocking of growth in sustainable and politically acceptable 
ways might be addressed in the South East of England. This soft planning space, as a new 
vehicle for the playing-out of a long-standing territorial politics will continue to be symptomatic 
of what is arguably a peculiarly British scattered and non-contiguous morphology of 
 33 
development, including high technology industry. The relationship of science to settlement space 
in Britain appears to be one not of science in the city, nor, for the most part, of science in the 
garden suburb campus (Forsyth and Crewe, 2010) but of science in villages and market towns 
detached from an adequate framework of housing, service and transport infrastructural 
preconditions necessary for its longer term reproduction.  
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